Abstract-Group key establishment is one of the basic building blocks in securing group communication. In this paper, motivated by Desmedt's BD-II protocol, we propose a secure ID-Based group key establishment protocol which has a constant number of rounds and requires only (log ) O n computation and communication. Our scheme achieves key negotiate by scalar multiplication other than using pairing computation which requires expensive computation cost. Moreover, we have adapted aggregate signature technique verifying the validity of transcripts simultaneously, which greatly improves the computational efficiency. We have proved the security of protocol under the intractability of DDH problem in the RO model. Index Terms-group key establishment, identity-based, tree structure, aggregate signature
I. INTRODUCTION
Authenticated group key establishment (AGKE) protocols allow a group of users communicating over an insecure, open network to establish a shared secret called session key and furthermore to be guaranteed that they are indeed sharing this session key with their intended partners.
The problem of designing efficient key establishment protocols with lower computation and communication cost and round complexity have received much attention.
The first pioneering work for key establishment is the Diffie-Hellman protocol [1] which invents the public key cryptography and revolutionizes the field of modern cryptography. In 1994, Burmester and Desmedt [2] presented a famous efficient key establishment protocol (BD protocol) in group setting that requires constant round.
A. Tree-based group key establishment
Although BD protocol is considered algebraically nice, it is rarely used in real life application. As has been pointed out by many authors, e.g. [3] (p.86) "One shortcoming of BD is the high communication overhead." It is for this reason that tree based group key exchange protocols are considered superior. Kim et al. [3] [4] [5] investigated a novel group key exchange approach which blend logical key trees with DiffieHelleman key exchange. It yields a secure protocol suite called Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) protocol that is both simple and fault-tolerant. Moreover, the TGDH protocol achieves logarithmic computation complexity. Later, Lee et al. [6] present a pairing-based variant of the TGDH protocol using ternary key tree which reduces the computation cost 2 (log ) O n of TGDH to 3 (log ) O n . Barua and Dutta [7] construct their protocols by combining a ternary tree structure with the one-round tripartite protocol of Joux [8] . Then, Dutta and Barua [9] presented the authenticated version of [7] , and considered the dynamic case in [10] . All these tree-based protocols have (log ) O n communication rounds. Burmester and Desmedt [11] also proposed a tree-based group key establishment protocol(BD-II protocol). This protocol (i.e., protocol 2 of [11] ) seems to be the first group key establishment protocol utilizing a binary tree structure, and differs from all other protocols mentioned above in that there exists a bijective mapping between protocol participants and tree nodes. However, it is unauthenticated because an active adversary who has control over the channel can mount a man-in-the-middle attack to agree upon separate keys with the users without the users being aware of this and the attacker could impersonate an honest user, thus trick others into believing that they share a key with the trusted users.
Modifying Katz-Yung compiler, Desmedt et al. [12] introduced a protocol, an authenticated version of the BD-II protocol with an overall communication and computation complexity of (log ) O n , while running in a constant number of rounds.
Recently, Nam et al. [13] proposed a forward-secure authenticated group key establishment protocol that achieves both constant round complexity and logarithmic computation complexity. The scalability of the protocol is achieved by using a complete binary tree structure. But, as has been pointed out by Desmedt et al. [12] (p.4), "One shortcoming of that paper is that they require each party to check all signatures on all messages; this implies that they have ( ) O n computation costs rather than the desired (log ) O n ."
B. ID-based group key establishment
Among the existing authentication systems, asymmetric technologies such as public key infrastructure (PKI) and Identity-based (ID-based) system are commonly adopted. The concept of ID-based cryptosystem was firstly proposed by Shamir [14] in 1984.
An IBE system is a public key system where an encryptor uses only the identity of the recipient and a set of global public parameters, so a separate public key for each entity is not required. A trusted authority holds a master secret key which allows it to create secret keys for identities and distribute them to authenticated users. Identity-based encryption was first realized by Boneh and Franklin [15] and Cocks [16] . In Crypto 2001, Boneh and Franklin proposed Identity-based encryption from Weil pairing, while Cocks' scheme is based on the Quadratic Residuosity problem.
Later, ID-based authenticated group key establishment has been increasingly researched because of the simplicity of a public key management.
In one of the breakthroughs in key establishment, Joux [8] proposed a single round tripartite key establishment using Weil and Tate pairings. This was the first positive application of bilinear pairings in cryptography. Unfortunately, Joux's method does not seem possible to be extended to larger groups consisting of more than three parties since the method is based on the bilinearity itself. Reddy [17] and Barua, et al. [7] proposed ID-based multi party key establishment scheme which use tree structure. In PKC'04, Choi et al. [18] proposed an ID-based authenticated group key establishment protocol from bilinear pairings. But soon Zhang et al. [19] proposed an impersonation attack on Choi's ID-based authenticated group key establishment scheme. Identity-based constant round group key establishment protocol via secret-share was proposed by Cao et al. [20] , each user performs n Lagarangian polynomial interpolation, so the protocol is inefficient from point of view of computation rate.
C. Our contribution
This paper present an ID-based group key establishment protocol modified BD-II protocol [11] , which users be arranged into tree structure. Our protocol achieves authentication by using ID-based public key cryptosystem, and achieves session key negotiate by scalar multiplication other than using pairing computation. In addition, the protocol provides a batch verification technique which has been used in group key establishment setting, e.g. [18, 9, 20] . Batch verification technique simultaneously verifies the validity of messages from other group participants. All these result greatly improves computational efficiency. We then prove its security under the decisional DH assumptions in the RO model.
Organization The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We define our security model in Section II. We review cryptographic primitives needed in Section III. We review the BD-II scheme in Section IV and present our ID-based AGKA protocols in Section V, prove its security in section VI and analyze its efficiency in Section VII respectively. Finally we conclude in Section VIII.
II. MODEL
In Crypto 1993, Bellare and Rogaway [21] first consider a formal treatment for provable security of key exchange protocols in two party setting. The formal model proposed by Bresson, Chevassut, Pointcheval and Quisquater [22] , which called BCPQ model, is truly the first computational security model which has been designed for group key exchange protocols. The model allows reductionism security proofs and extends the methodology used in the BR model to a group setting. In their subsequent work, Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval [23] extend the BCPQ model to deal with dynamic group key exchange protocols where group membership may change during the protocol execution, which denoted BCP model.
The model described in this section similar to Choi, et al. [17] which extends the BCPQ model and BCP model.
A Security Model
Participants. We assume that each user i U has a unique identity i ID from {0,1} l and all identities are distinct. We also assume for simplicity a fixed set of protocol users
where the number of users is polynomial in the security parameter k . In the model we allow each user i U ∈ U to execute the protocol many times with different users. Instances of a user i U model distinct, but possibly concurrent executions of the protocol. We denote instance i d of a user i U , called an oracle, by
Initialization. During this phase, each user i U ∈ U gets public and private keys. ID-based GKE protocol requires the following initialization phase.
The master secret key msk and global parameters Params are generated by algorithm : 
B Security Notions
Session ID and Partnering. We assume that session IDs are assigned and provided by some higher-level protocol. It seems very useful in protocols where some protocol messages are not broadcast and thus not all participants have the same view of a protocol run. A group ID is a set consisting of the identities of the users who intend to establish a session key among themselves. We use An instance is said to accept when it successfully computes a session key in a protocol execution. Let 
Freshness. An oracle Definitions of Security. We define the security of the protocol by following game between the adversary A and an infinite set of oracles
a) The long-term keys are assigned to each user through the initialization phase related to the security parameter. b) Run adversary A who may issue some queries and get back the answers by the corresponding oracles. c) At some stage during the execution a Test query is issued by the adversary to a fresh oracle. The adversary may continue to make other queries, eventually outputs its guess b' for the bit b involved in the Test query and terminates. In this game, the advantage of the adversary A is measured by the ability distinguishing the session group key from a random value, i.e. its ability guessing b. We define Succ to be the event that A correctly guesses the bit b used by the Test oracle in the answering this query. The advantage of an adversary A in attacking protocol Π is defined as
We say that a protocol Π is a secure (ID-based authenticated) group key establishment scheme if the following two properties are satisfied: a) Correctness: in the presence of adversary partner oracles accept the same key. b) Indistinguishability: for every PPT adversary A , ( ) Authentication. In this paper, we focus on AGKE with implicit authentication; a key establishment protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication if users are assured that no other users except partners can possibly learn the value of a particular secret key. Note that the property of implicit key authentication does not necessarily mean that partners have actually obtained the key.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some assumptions related to our protocol. Through the paper, we assume that 1 G is a cyclic additive group of prime order q and 2 G is a cyclic multiplicative group of same order q , and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in both 1 G and 2 G are intractable.
A. Admissible Bilinear Map
Let P be an arbitrary generator of 1 G . A map The Advantage of any PPT adversary A in solving DDH problem in 1 G is defined to be: 
C. Aggregate Signature
In the construction of our authenticated protocol, we use the bilinear aggregate signature scheme firstly introduced by Boneh et al. [24] . But the base signature scheme is the ID-based bilinear signature scheme proposed by Hess [25] . An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature that supports aggregation. Concretely, given n signatures on n distinct messages from n distinct participants, it is possible to aggregate all these signatures into a single short signature. This single signature and the n original messages will convince the verifier that participant i U indeed signed message i m . IV. REVIEW BD-II SCHEME
In this section we briefly recall the BD-II scheme [11, 12] in the multicast version.
Fig1. The Binary BD-tree in the BD-II scheme Let 1 , , n U U be the users who want to make a group key establishment. We now show how their index automatically determines their place in the (almost) binary tree as in Figure 1 . This ordered tree has the property that user i U is at level U U be the set of all users who want to generate a group session key. Assume that they are arranged in the binary tree as in Figure 1 . The key exchange is performed in a group g of order ℓ with generator g . 
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V. THE PROTOCOL ID-BITREE
In this section we present an ID-based AGKE protocol based on the previous protocol BD-II. We denote this protocol by ID-BiTree. The protocol involves the trusted key generation center (KGC).
System setup: Given the security parameter k , the KGC chooses groups 1 G and 2 G of prime order q , a generator P of 1 G , a bilinear map 
Assume that they are arranged in the binary tree as in Figure 1 . Now we describe the protocol in detail. Remark1: Honest users compute the same key 1 2 SK k k P = . We prove this claim by induction. First observe that 1
It is obvious that we have:
( ) U use information by their respective parents. So, for any user, the number of used messages is logarithmic in the total number of users. 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ID-BITREE
ψ receives an instance ( , , , )
P aP bP cP of the DDH problem as input. Now ψ can generate a valid transcript for A as shown below. Then ψ runs A on this transcript and outputs 1, i.e., the claim that ( , , , ) P aP bP cP is a valid Diffie-Hellman triple, if A outputs 1 and outputs 0 otherwise. 
, , , , , , , , ,
, 
Consider the distributions T defined by ψ as follows: 
n n p n n parent n q n parent parent n n pub pub 
, , , , , , , , , , , , , Efficiency of a protocol is measured by communication and computation costs. Communication cost involves counting total number of rounds needed and total number of messages transmitted through the network during a protocol execution. Computation cost counts total number of pairing-computations, exponentiations or scalar multiplications, etc. We now compare our protocol ID-BiTree with other previously known ID-based GKE protocols, the binary tree based 2T-ID AGKE [16] , the ternary tree based 3T-ID AGKE [7] , the ID-base BD protocol [17] and ID-SS protocol [19] in Table 1 From the table I, we can see that Our ID-based AGKE protocol is most efficient in computational and communicational costs as compared to other previous known ID-based AGKE protocols.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper present a secure ID-Based version based on the authenticated BD-II protocol which users be arranged into a tree structure. Without being modify the complier, the presented protocol achieved authentication and has a constant number of rounds and requires only (log ) O n computation and communication. Moreover, we have adapted batch verification technique verifying the validity of transcripts simultaneously, which greatly improves the computational efficiency. We have proved the security of protocol under the intractability of DDH problem.
One shortcoming of our protocol is non-contributory in the sense that the key does not depend on the contribution of all members. In fact, no protocol with a computation or communication complexity lower than ( ) O n can be fully contributory if it runs in a constant number of rounds and without delay.
One issue that has not been addressed here is security against malicious insiders. The further work would be to address this and similar issues also. 
